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2017 Wilkins–Bernal–Medawar Lecture 
 
Why philosophy of science matters to science 
 
by Michela Massimi, FRSE 
 
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences 
University of Edinburgh 
3 Charles Street 
Edinburgh EH8 9AD 
michela.massimi@ed.ac.uk 
 
 
In an era where science is increasingly specialised, what is the value of interdisciplinary research? 
I argue that research across disciplinary boundaries plays a pivotal role in scientific inquiry, and it 
has a threefold value: it is exploratory; it is unifying; and it offers critical engagement. Philosophy of 
science is an interesting example of interdisciplinary research at the junction between the sciences 
and the humanities. What good can philosophy of science do for science? Despite anecdotal 
reports to the contrary, philosophy of science can in fact do important work for science. When it 
comes to critical engagement, I highlight what I call the social function of philosophy of science and I 
illustrate it with three examples taken from contemporary debates about evidence, progress, and 
truth in science. A socially responsible philosophy of science—which is not afraid to speak up for 
evidence, progress, and truth in science—best serves the needs of science in a tolerant, pluralist, 
and democratic society.   
 
 
Keywords: philosophy of science; interdisciplinary research; evidence; truth; progress in 
science. 
 
 
A CELEBRATION OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
 
In an era where science is increasingly specialised, what is the value of interdisciplinary research? 
In what follows, I will make the case for research that crosses disciplinary boundaries by attending 
to three main tasks. First, I want to celebrate what in my view is the threefold value of 
interdisciplinary research. Second, I highlight the particular role of philosophy of science (my 
research area) within the broader field of interdisciplinary research.  Third, I make the case for 
what I am going to call the social function of philosophy of science and show how and why this particular 
kind of interdisciplinary research best serves the needs of democratic societies.  
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But, if I may, I’d like to start with a brief intellectual-biographical note. The notification 
letter for the Wilkins-Bernal-Medawar award mentioned my “interdisciplinary interest in and 
communication of modern philosophy and science: particularly in relation to physics, and the 
thinking of Newton, Kant and Pauli.” When I received the letter, I remember smiling at the 
thought of the Newton, Kant, and Pauli trio—what most unusual combination of research 
interests I have always had, and what are the chances that one day I will get to stand at the Royal 
Society to receive an award for having such an idiosyncratic combination of interests. What is the 
underlying thread that binds these seemingly very diverse research interests of mine and for which 
I am receiving an award tonight?  
The answer is interdisciplinarity. Think of each and every one of these three scholars.  Isaac 
Newton, President of the Royal Society (1703-1727) wrote the Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy (as at the time physics was called), where he laid out the fundamental laws governing 
classical mechanics (from planetary orbits to free fall and tides among many other phenomena). 
But he also enjoyed speculating about chemistry and chemical experiments. Indeed, the very same 
Newton who famously declared “not to feign hypotheses” in the Principia, indulged in experimental 
speculations about the role of the ether in the Queries added to the Opticks giving rise to a very 
influential tradition of speculative Newtonian experimentalism.1 This tradition thrived in Britain 
and in the Netherland throughout the 18th century with Herman Boerhaave and Stephen Hales2 
and ultimately influenced  Immanuel Kant’s theory of matter.3 But Newton was not just interested 
in physics and chemistry. He actively engaged with metaphysics and theology. In De gravitatione (an 
unpublished manuscript written most probably before the 1678 Principia)4 Newton defended the 
thesis that space is an affection of being—be it God, human minds, or material bodies. And since 
God exists always and everywhere, space and time—Newton argued—must exist always and 
everywhere. Indeed, in the General Scholium to the Principia Newton grounded absolute space and 
absolute time on what he called the “Lord God Pantokrator” ruling “all things, not as the world 
soul but as the lord of all”.5 It is this overarching philosophical-metaphysical framework that 
ultimately explains Newton’s views about the nature of gravity, of mass, space, and time.  
This Newtonian tradition proved hugely influential for the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Best 
known among philosophers for his groundbreaking contribution to theoretical philosophy, moral 
philosophy and aesthetics, Kant was also a keen scholar in the natural sciences.  He wrote essays 
about the age of the Earth (1754), the causes of earthquakes (1756), the theory of winds (1756), 
and the volcanoes on the Moon (1785), among others.6 Kant’s very first text back in the late 1740s 
was entitled Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces (1746–9).7 The topic was the then lively 
debate between Cartesians and Leibnizians on the nature of forces at work in elastic collisions 
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(what at the time was called vis viva, the ancestor of our modern notion of kinetic energy). Inspired 
by Newton’s Opticks and Hales’s Vegetable Staticks, the young Kant referred to gravity and repulsive 
force (or elasticity) as two grounds for a plurality of effects in nature. Many years later, in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,8 Kant took attraction and repulsion as two fundamental 
forces through which he articulated a sophisticated view of the lawful unity of nature and the 
necessity of the laws of nature.9 Kant saw his project as continuous with the scientific work of 
Newton in providing metaphysical foundations for the physical sciences. 
The same continuity between philosophy and science can be found in the founding fathers 
of quantum mechanics. This is where I started my philosophical journey back as an undergraduate 
student at the University of Rome La Sapienza, reading the Bohr–Einstein debate on the 
completeness of quantum mechanics in 1927-1935 and looking at the role of Wolfgang Pauli within 
the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as I ventured into my postgraduate 
studies in London. Bohr read the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard, as much as Einstein read Ernst 
Mach. 10 The debate on the nature of physical reality between Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen and Bohr11 
in 1935 is a profound philosophical debate as much as it is a debate about the epistemic limits of 
quantum mechanics. Wolfgang Pauli’s conversations with Bohr and Heisenberg in the early 1920s 
on the nature of quantum phenomena and the Pauli exclusion principle became the topic of my 
doctoral work, from which my monograph came out.12 
It is this dialogue between philosophy and science—well exemplified by the works of  
Newton, Kant and Pauli, among many others—that has always fascinated me. And it is this 
dialogue between philosophy and science that I want to celebrate in this lecture. In an era of 
increasing specializations, what is the value of crossing disciplinary boundaries? Both philosophers 
and scientists these days do not necessarily read other subjects at university; or, get trained in a 
broad range of topics in senior schools. Large scientific collaborations enforce a granular level of 
scientific expertise. In philosophy too, there is a tendency to get specialised at a very early stage in 
the postgraduate education. The whole ‘ethos’ of doing research today both in philosophy and in 
science—reflected in institutional practices of how scientific research is incentivised; how research 
outputs are evaluated; and research funding distributed—has dramatically changed from the times 
of Newton, Kant, and Pauli. What good is then interdisciplinary research today? Answering this 
question is my first task, to which I now turn. 
 
 THE THREEFOLD VALUE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 
 
Let me start by recounting some contemporary facts that illustrate why we need interdisciplinary 
research. It is a fact that some of the global challenges that confront our society today require an 
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interdisciplinary approach: from climate change to population health; from fighting famine to 
tackling violence in our streets; interdisciplinary approaches are often required.  
Consider, as an example, aggressive behaviour behind knife crime that has sadly become a 
daily reality in our streets. What causes aggressive behaviour? What could be done to prevent it? 
Obviously, there are no easy answers to these questions, and this is a situation where an integrated 
interdisciplinary approach might work best. For example, in her book Studying Human Behaviour: 
How Scientists investigate aggression and sexuality,13 the philosopher of science Helen Longino charts the 
course for a pluralist interdisciplinary approach to understand aggressive behaviour. Longino 
argues that to successfully explain aspects of human behaviour —such as aggression—it is 
necessary to abandon the presumption that there is one single correct approach and acknowledge 
the advantages of adopting a form of theoretical pluralism. In the example in question, Longino 
argues, behaviour genetics, social-environmental approach, neurobiology, and developmental 
systems are all important in an explanation of aggressive behaviour. Although each approach is 
characterized by distinctive questions, methods and assumptions, and although each differs in 
identifying the causes of the aggressive behaviour, at the same time all approaches are needed 
because they reinforce each other and help tease out different causal factors at play in the 
phenomenon. 
 The same is true about tackling some challenges in developing countries where in addition 
to agricultural technology and the so-called ‘miracle seeds’, more recently AI and robotics have 
been brought in to solve very specific problems. Recent news headlines have highlighted for 
example how robotics can help improve the living standards in rural communities (for example by 
having robots carrying out daily tasks such as carrying water from a distant well). Resorting to 
artificial intelligence to tackle societal challenges in turn raise important ethical questions about the 
responsible use and monitoring of technology. What is the just distribution of technology in 
developing countries? Who is benefitting from it? How do women’s roles in rural communities 
change as a result of introducing technologies? Is this use of technology liberating? Or, is it 
fostering further inequalities? Philosophers14 working on the ethics of AI have recently begun to 
address some of these issues and explore the ethical implications of increasingly resorting to AI 
and robotics.  
 Or consider, as a further example, how interdisciplinary research has revolutionised 
medical diagnostics. The first PET scan, routinely used these days in cancer diagnostics, was carried 
out at CERN in Geneva, using technology originally developed for particle physics. In 1968 
Georges Charpak introduced multi-wire chambers that revolutionized the old-fashioned method 
of visually inspecting photographs from bubble chambers. David Townsend was a professor in the 
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Department of Medicine, at the University of Tennessee Medical Center and began to work with 
Charpak multi-wire chambers at CERN in 1970, pioneering the new technology of PET scans and 
combining it with computed tomography (CT). The first PET scan of a mouse took place at CERN 
in 1977 and the radiobiology group at CERN played an important role in studying the practical 
uses and damaging effects of ionizing radiation on living organisms.15 This fruitful way of exporting 
tools from physics to medicine is a powerful reminder of the fruitfulness of analogical reasoning 
in modelling across different areas, a topic on which the philosopher of science Mary Hesse 
extensively contributed to.16  
 These three are examples of what I am going to call the exploratory value of 
interdisciplinary research. One of the main (and surely most familiar) values of inter-disciplinary 
research is to cross disciplinary bridges and transfer knowledge from one field onto another one, or to integrate 
diverse disciplinary fields so as to gain a better understanding of complex phenomena: e.g., how to apply 
knowledge from particle physics to medical imaging; from robotics to specific problem-solving 
related to societal challenges; or, how to integrate different kinds of knowledge  to produce new 
knowledge (say about aggressive behaviour). This is an exercise rife with practical and intellectual 
rewards and with a huge impact on human lives and society.  
But there are other reasons why interdisciplinary research is necessary, reasons that have 
less to do with the needs to address societal challenges and more to do with the working patterns 
and deliverable outputs in specific fields that seem to increasingly demand a level of 
interdisciplinary expertise.  Consider, for example, cosmology. In contemporary observational 
cosmology, the use of Bayesian statistics is widespread. For example, the Bayes factor, which 
measures the ratio between the probability of the evidence D in favour of a null hypothesis H0 (for 
example, the LCDM model)17 over the probability of the evidence in favour of a rival hypothesis 
H1 (say, a variant of the LCDM model) is widely used in both model selection and parameter 
estimation in cosmology. And yet, Bayesian statistics is not necessarily an integral part of the 
education and training that students and early career scholars receive in cosmology. In this case, 
the importance of interdisciplinary education resides in the ability of specific communities to 
acquire a range of tools and resources that prove indispensable to deliver on the very research 
outcomes they are meant to deliver on. Having a well rounded university training across a broad 
range of relevant subjects best equip students and researchers to understand the problems at hand, 
to anticipate solutions, and to identify possible common patterns. To return to my example, getting 
acquainted with statistics and the role of the Bayes factor in model selection across a range of 
diverse fields (say ecology, cosmology, or forensic science, just to give some examples), is important 
to understand the context-sensitivity of the standards of evidence offered by the Bayes factor 
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interpreted along the Jeffreys scale in different fields. To clarify this point, in observational 
cosmology it is common to interpret the Bayes factor along a Jeffreys scales that goes from 1 to 
10, where the evidence in favour of a null hypothesis H0 over a rival H1 is regarded as either 
substantial, strong or decisive depending on where the Bayes factor sits on the Jeffreys scale from 
1 to 10.18 By contrast, in forensic science, for example, the Jeffreys scale is typically expanded to 
much higher values. This is because using the Bayes factor to establish whether the evidence 
favours the hypothesis “innocent” over the hypothesis “guilty” in any criminal case requires a more 
nuanced approach (taking into account a number of important circumstantial factors) and a more 
fine-grained Jeffreys scale.  
This is another area where philosophy of science provides a helpful guide in assessing the 
prospects and problems of interpreting statistical evidence in science (either by using the Bayes 
factor along the Jeffreys scale as in cosmology;19 or by exploring the use of frequentist methods as 
Margaret Morrison has beautifully done,20 looking at how statistical methods entered from 
physics into population genetics). This is an example of what I am going to call the unifying 
value of interdisciplinary research. Interdisciplinary research matters because it allows us to identify 
possible inferential strategies, methodological approaches, and patterns common to very diverse 
research fields and to investigate the epistemic limits and fruitfulness of these universal features in 
any specific field of inquiry.  
But there is a third reason why interdisciplinary research matters. Sometimes 
interdisciplinary research is not just functional to finding common inferential strategies or patterns. 
Nor to explore how to successfully transfer tools from one domain onto another. Often enough 
the goal of interdisciplinary research is to critically engage with a discipline. I am going to call this 
the critical engagement value of interdisciplinary research. I have already mentioned the role that 
philosophy of science can play for both the exploratory value (think of Longino on aggressive 
behaviour; or the ethics of AI; or Hesse’s work on analogies) and the unifying value (with 
philosophy of probability, be it Bayesian inferences or frequentist methods). But it is really primarily 
to this third critical engagement value that philosophers of science have and can contribute most. 
And in what follows, I unpack and zoom into what is involved and what is at stake in the critical 
engagement value of interdisciplinary research when it comes to philosophy of science.  
 
THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE WITHIN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 
 
 
What good is philosophy for science? Or better, as the title of this lecture suggests, why does 
philosophy of science matter to science? That philosophy of science matters to science is not a 
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foregone conclusion. On the contrary, philosophers of science have often been the target of bad 
press among scientists. Philosophy of science has often been perceived as a useless intellectual 
exercise. Other times, philosophy of science has been declared incapable of making progress and 
keeping up with science and scientific advancements. In the latter case the perception is that 
philosophy is stuck with the same old questions and does not contribute to any new insights by 
contrast with science that is fast-growing all the time. But to me as a budding eighteen-year old 
student, who wanted to read philosophy at university, the most haunting allegory of how useless a 
degree in philosophy might be remains the caricature of philosophers given by the ancient Greek 
playwright Aristophanes in a play called The Clouds where Socrates is described as the Head of the 
Thinkery, whose important recent discoveries include measuring the jump of a flea on the floor! 
Hence a dilemma for philosophers at large and philosophers of science in particular: at best they 
are useless to science and to scientists; at worst, they are laughable in their pointless endeavours.  
What kind of interdisciplinary contribution can philosophy of science ever give? And why does it 
matter to science? Before I go on to substantiate a positive answer to this question, let me get clear 
– jokes and anecdotes aside—about what I think is misguided about this way of thinking about 
philosophy of science. Dismissive claims about philosophy of science seem all to start from a 
widespread and ultimately misguided assumption. Namely, that philosophy has to be of use for 
scientists, otherwise it is of no use.  
In response, let me make some gently polemical remarks. Philosophy of science—like any 
other discipline in the humanities—does not have to be of use to scientists (or anyone else for that 
matter), for it to be of some use. We would not assess the value of Celtic archaeology in terms of its 
use to the Celts. Nor would we assess the intellectual value of Roman history in terms of how 
useful it might be to the Romans themselves. For we all (I hope) recognise and acknowledge that 
the intellectual values of archaeology, history, anthropology, or else should not be measured and 
assessed in terms of how useful these humanistic disciplines are for their subjects of study (past or 
present that they might be). Why should philosophy of science be any different from archaeology, 
history, or anthropology?   
I see philosophy of science as a valuable discipline—like any other in the humanities—
whose beneficiary target is humankind, broadly speaking. We build narratives about science. We 
scrutinise scientific methodologies and modelling practices. We engage with the theoretical 
foundations of science and its conceptual nuances, because science (and scientific knowledge) is a 
human activity (like many others) that is worth investigating and exploring. And we owe this 
intellectual investigation to humankind. It is part of our cultural heritage and scientific history. It is 
part of who we are as a community of epistemic agents that have evolved across time and developed 
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sophisticated scientific practices and a distinctive kind of scientific knowledge. The philosopher of 
science that explores Bayesian methods in cosmology; or who scrutinises assumptions behind 
population genetics, or else, is no different from the archaeologist, the historian, or the 
anthropologist in producing knowledge that is useful for us qua humankind with a rich cultural and 
scientific history, which is constantly evolving, which ought to be studied, and on which there is 
always more to discover because our philosophical tools evolve and get refined along the journey.  
This leads me to my third final and more substantive task for this lecture, namely to make the case 
for what I am going to call the social function of philosophy of science and how this particular 
kind of interdisciplinary research best serves the needs of democratic societies. 
 
THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
I am going to concentrate on three topics in contemporary public discourse on science and 
highlight how philosophy of science contributes to these ongoing debates in the public sphere. But 
before I do so, I’d like to latch onto some important and still timely remarks by John Desmond 
Bernal, one of the three scientists this Medal lecture is named after. In the 1939 book The Social 
Function of Science Bernal21 gave the following vivid portrait of what he perceived as the tangible risk 
for science to remain isolated and detached from society: 
 
There is no getting away from it: to a large extent science has become detached from popular 
consciousness and the result is very bad for both. It is bad for people at large partly because 
living in an increasingly man-made world they are gradually falling behind in their awareness 
of the mechanisms that control their lives.. …The far more dangerous grip which demagogic 
fascist ideas can exercise is a measure both of popular ignorance and the need to have 
something to believe... But it is also very bad for science…unless people at large—and this 
will include wealthy benefactors and Government officials—know what the scientists are 
about, they can hardly be expected to provide that assistance which the scientist feels his 
work demands in return for its probable benefit to humanity…Among people of literary 
culture there is almost an affectation of knowing nothing about science; nor have the 
scientists themselves escaped from it. In their case it refers to all other sciences than their 
own. It is one of the rarest things to find good general conversations on scientific topics, and 
this is true even when scientists are the majority of the company. This was certainly not the 
case when Voltaire and Madam Du Chatêlet conducted philosophical experiments at their 
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house parties or when Shelley discussed chemistry and moral perfection with equal 
enthusiasm (88-89).  
 
Bernal’s remarks are a powerful reminder about the importance of public understanding of science, 
both for science and for democratic societies. They are an invitation to see science not as an isolated 
specialist exercise (he referred to it as the ‘evils of specialisation’) but as part of our broader cultural 
history. And he made a persuasive plea for making the public at large feel part of that cultural 
history that is our common heritage. Unsurprisingly, I think Bernal in this passage refers to the 
philosophers Voltaire and Gabrielle Émilie Du Châtelet as examples of how science used to be 
part of the broader cultural tradition and how conversations on science used to take place in 
philosophical salons in the eighteenth century.22  
Taking the cue from Bernal, it is to this social function (not just of science) but also of 
philosophy of science that I want to turn next. Because I believe that philosophers and scientists 
bear similar responsibilities in delivering on such a social function. I further believe they can only 
deliver on this social function by working together. We owe this joint scholarly effort to our 
democratic societies, even if the immediate usefulness of this kind of interdisciplinary endeavour 
might not be self-evident. And to illustrate what I mean by social function of philosophy of science 
(or how philosophers of science can contribute to public discourse on science), consider these 
three key words that are so engrained in our public discourse and yet so elusive, possibly misused 
and abused in many quarters: evidence; progress; and truth.  
 
Evidence 
 
Public discourse (and media coverage) about the role of evidence in science is often intertwined 
with public controversies which often enough are stirred by political lobbies and agendas: think of 
debates about evidence for climate change; or, evidence for the benefits of children’s 
immunizations; or, evidence for economic growth, just to mention some examples. Of course, it is 
the job of scientists to find out the evidence (the scientific facts) in each of these cases. But I believe 
it is equally the job of philosophers of science to work alongside scientists and explore how 
evidence enters into forecasts and computer simulations; to analyse how evidence gets calibrated 
and used to draw conclusions about the likely increase in temperature over the next 25 years; how 
evidence is used to make forecasts about economic growth; or, ultimately, how evidence enters 
into deciding why it is indeed a good policy to immunise children.  It is part of the social function 
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of philosophy of science to work alongside the relevant sciences and build narratives about 
evidence and its use to inform political decision-making and public policy.   
In my own work, I have not been dealing with climate science or medicine or economics, 
but nonetheless the problem of evidence has been and is a recurrent one also for modern physics. 
Evidence in some areas of physics does not come forward very easily. It is difficult to harvest, and 
even more difficult to analyse. Let me briefly return to cosmology as an example and current 
research on dark matter, which is another area I have been working on more recently. According 
to the current cosmological model (the LCDM model), the universe consists of 70% dark energy, 
25% dark matter and 5% ordinary matter. Clarifying the nature of dark matter and dark energy 
remains an open and pressing question for contemporary research both in particle physics and 
cosmology. What is dark matter for example? So far there are a plurality of hypotheses about what 
dark matter might be; but direct detection experiments have given null results as of today. So where 
does the evidence for dark matter come from?  
Some of the main evidence (not the only one) for dark matter comes in the form of 
galaxies’s flat rotation curves and dark matter computer simulations for large scale structure. Dark 
matter is introduced to explain the well-known observation dating back to Vera Rubin and 
collaborators23 work in the 1970s that the rotational velocity of spiral galaxies instead of decreasing 
with distance from the center of the galaxy —as one would expect— is observed to remain flat. 
This is taken as evidence for the existence of dark matter halos surrounding galaxies, and inside 
which galaxies would have formed (the same massive halos, which incidentally, are necessary to 
guarantee dynamical stability to galactic disks). 
But there are other pieces of evidence that some critics in cosmology have argued invite a 
more cautious approach to dark matter. More recently, the debate has focussed on some 
astrophysical evidence, which takes the name of Baryonic Tully-Fisher (BTF)24 relation (which is 
an empirical relation between the baryonic mass of galaxies vis-á-vis their flat velocities to the 
power of 4) as evidence25 that can be explained without the need to introduce dark matter but only 
by modifying Newton’s laws at cosmic scales (within what is known as Modified Newtonian 
Gravity or MOND). This same evidence can be retrieved within the LCDM model by using 
sophisticated computer simulations.26  
How can philosophers contribute to this debate? Clearly, it is not a philosopher’s job to give 
verdicts about who is right or who is wrong in this debate internal to cosmology; and, it is certainly 
not our job to pontificate on the nature of evidence as such. But it is our job as philosophers to 
reflect on the explanatory power, on the consistency across scales, and on the predictive novelty of different 
theoretical proposals in cosmology vis-à-vis these different pieces of evidence across different 
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scales. Does LCDM have the power to explain BTF as opposed to retrieve data? Do dark-matter-
free rivals have the same ability of LCDM to model structure formation across scales? Do hybrid 
proposals that have recently been put forward to achieve the best of both worlds in this debate 
have genuine predictive novelty?27 These are questions for philosophers of science to ask, to 
investigate, and to try to answer in dialogue with scientists involved in this debate.28  
Genuine new knowledge is produced through this interdisciplinary exercise of critical 
engagement between philosophy and science. Philosophers have a role to play: their work can 
advance an existing debate which may be based on questionable assumptions or on different 
epistemic priorities. Philosophers can contribute to ongoing discussions by elucidating how and 
why for example the disagreement among experts is not so much about the data, but more about 
whether the data provide evidence for a new physics; or, can instead be accommodated within the 
existing paradigm, as with this example from contemporary cosmology. Investigating the nature of 
scientific confirmation, procedures for checking datasets consistency, inferences used in 
parameters calibration, methods adopted for model selection, the reliability of computer 
simulations to retrieve particular phenomena, these all fall within the remit of philosophers of 
science—and they are (or should be) an integral part of what a well-rounded scientific inquiry ought 
to look like. Philosophers can shed light on scientific debates, not because philosophers know 
better. Or because philosophers have any normative authority in telling scientists what to do next. 
But simply because discussions about modelling practices, the epistemic limits of computer 
simulations, calibration, data-to-phenomena inferences are not the sort of discussions that working 
scientists typically engage with in their daily job. And often enough, the answer to some of these 
pressing questions as to whether the data are indeed evidence for something depends also on how we 
—as a community of inquirers— tackle and answer these broader methodological and conceptual 
questions.  
 I am going to call this the enabling role of philosophy of science in its social function. 
Philosophy of science enables scientific inquiry by unpacking some of the machinery behind 
evidence, modelling, calibration, confirmation, explanation, simulation, predictive novelty, and so 
on. In this sense philosophy of science is continuous with the sciences. Our enabling role is to 
contribute to interdisciplinary discussions with the conceptual tools and methodological sensitivity 
that we have and help scientists obtain in the public sphere and to the public eyes what Bernal in 
the quote above aptly described as “that assistance which the scientist feels his work demands in 
return for its probable benefit to humanity”. 
 
Progress 
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We worry all the time about progress in science – has science made enough progress? How are we 
going to measure whether scientific progress has been made in particular areas and on particular 
targets? Metric-obsessed institutional practices force us to quantify all the time our research impact, 
and measure whether milestones towards goals have been met. Questions about progress are 
entangled with questions about research funding. Should tax-payers’ money be spent on research 
programmes that have not made enough progress on target objectives? But what is progress in 
science? And how can philosophers help with this question? 
Scientists are likely to answer to this question in terms of technological advances – look 
how far we have come! We build satellites and put them on orbit. We will have self-driving cars in 
the near future. We create new medicines that can fight diseases. Our progress is often couched in 
terms of discovery: we discovered the Higgs boson; we discovered the mechanism behind DNA 
replication; and so on. It seems that progress must be measured in terms of either discovery; or in 
terms of technological advances. 
Accordingly, a sense of frustration accompanies scientific research programmes where the 
public perception is that time and money have been invested for apparent no use and no returns – 
nothing has been discovered yet there; no immediate technological advances are in sight either, so 
why keep on investing precious taxpayer’s money on something that does not seem to be of any 
use? Think, as an example, of the current situation in high energy physics, where despite scientists’ 
widespread belief that the current Standard Model cannot be the full story (because of a series of 
theoretical problems still open as of today) nevertheless no new particle obeying a physics Beyond 
the Standard Model (BSM) has been found as of today. Should we keep investing money to build 
larger and more sensitive colliders that might be able to detect some BSM particles? I have seen 
countless occasions where in public talks or public events particle physicists get challenged on this 
score by the public. Why spend more money on fundamental research? What use is it for us? 
This is another area where I think philosophers as public intellectuals can and should 
intervene in public discourse and try to rectify some widespread misconceptions to the effect that 
either scientific research is of use to someone, or it has no use at all (and should not be funded as 
a result). This short-sighted approach as to how to measure success and progress in science (and 
relatedly how to communicate it to the public) is based on a philosophical misconception, namely 
that progress is measured primarily or mainly in terms of utility. Philosophy of science teaches us 
how to think about scientific progress. Neither in terms of sheer utility. Nor, necessarily, in terms 
of convergence to a Theory of Everything that many still dream of (and which, for all we know as 
of today, may or may not be found). So how to think about scientific progress?  
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High-energy physics beautifully exemplifies a different way of thinking about progress, where 
progress is measured by ruling out live possibilities, by excluding with high confidence level (95%) 
certain physically conceivable scenarios and mapping in this way the space of what might be objectively 
possible in nature. I have investigated some of the modelling practices involved in this exercise by 
looking among others at the ATLAS and CMS experiments at CERN,29 and some of the work 
done there by the SuperSymmetry (SUSY) group to identify exclusion regions where no signal has 
been found for these conceivable physical states.30 99.9% of the time this is how physics progresses 
and in the remaining time someone gets a Nobel Prize for discovering a new particle. But it is not 
that .01% of time that alone defines whether enough progress has been made in particle physics 
and justifies whether or not more public spending should go into more sophisticated particle 
colliders. Equally important, progress should be assessed on the basis of the remaining 99.9% of 
the time that physicists spent ruling out live possibilities and carving out the space of what might 
be objectively real. This is progress enough in science and being able to convey it to the public (and 
Government officials) is also the task of philosophers of science. This is an example of what I am 
going to call the self-reflective role of philosophy of science in its social function. Here philosophy of 
science is not just continuous with the science; but it provides instead a much-needed meta-level 
for stepping back, reflecting, and evaluating directions of research for assessing progress and 
success in science. 
 
Truth. 
 
Probably the image I have given so far of the philosopher of science engaged in public discourse 
on science on issues as wide-ranging as the role of evidence and the nature of scientific progress is 
less well known to many than the more familiar picture of the philosopher philosophising on truth 
with the capital T. Philosophers love (or hate, depending on who you ask) discussions about truth 
in science. An entire debate on realism and antirealism in philosophy of science has raged for over 
half a century and it is still ongoing.31 This is another area where I am currently working on for my 
ERC-funded project that aims to defend a realist view about science and argue that it is perfectly 
compatible with our knowledge being situated or perspectival, namely with our knowledge being 
from a specific vantage point (that of the theories, models, experiments, instruments and also 
values we share as a community of epistemic agents).32 Thus, let me conclude with some very brief 
remarks about truth and pluralism in science.  
Truth is an inconvenient word to be used in both science and in philosophy. It carries all 
sort of implicit connotations and often stereotypical associations. “Truth nothing but the truth” 
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might still be an important norm in legal systems; but the idea that there might be a truth about 
nature ruffles immediately some feathers among philosophers and historians of science, as if there 
was one single true objective story to be told about nature and as if the aim of science were to get 
there eventually (by error-and-trial, but still heading towards truth).  
But has not the history of science taught us some lesson there, my historian colleagues 
would hasten to correct me? Did not we believe in ether, in the geocentric system, in all sorts of 
elastic fluids (still evident in Dalton’s atoms), which we now consider mistakes of a bygone past? 
How can we be sure that the same fate will not fall upon our Standard Model in high-energy physics 
two hundred years down the line? Is not science subject to scientific revolutions and dramatic 
conceptual changes as Thomas Kuhn emphasised in the 1960s?33 And are not even our best 
scientific models just idealizations, “serendipitous falsehoods”34 which provide understanding but 
not truth as some philosophers of science have also recently argued for? And anyway, what is this 
phantom called Truth that philosophers of science that call themselves ‘realists’ have put on a 
pedestal as the goal or intended aim of scientific inquiry, if not what a particular community of 
inquirers is warranted to believe at a certain point in time (as the philosopher Hilary Putnam35 
argued for, building on the American Pragmatist tradition)?  
It gets worse. Is not truth in science associated with forms of petty doctrinalism and intra-
cultural battles that should not be allowed to take place in a tolerant, open, and genuinely pluralist 
society? How can we be genuinely realist in believing that science aims at truth while at the same 
time being pluralist about science? Those who might share Aristophanes’s image of the 
philosophers counting the jump of the fleas on the floor might grin at this point: ‘Here we go, the 
philosophers are now mandating their directives about Truth in science and pluralism in society as 
if they had any authority or expertise to legislate on either.’ 
No, we do not have any authority or expertise to legislate on either. But who does? And if 
it does not fall upon philosophers of science to at least talk upon such matters in public discourse, 
who should the task fall upon? Such matters cannot be left unspoken for they are too important. 
They cannot go unexplored because they impinge on anyone of us, with wide-ranging 
consequences for society. The point is that truth matters (or should matter to science) as much as 
it matters in legal systems. Truth is an invitation to resist the temptation to question just for the 
sake of questioning. It is a commitment to get things right and to adhere to evidence as the only 
tribunal to which one should respond to. In a culture were alternative facts seem to have made 
their way into media and public discourse in the name of some unqualified blanket pluralism, I see 
the role of philosophers of science to stand up with scientists for science. And to do so unabashedly, 
unequivocally, and uncompromisingly. Recognising that science is not a convenient expedient for 
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political agendas and powerful lobbies; that scientific models are more than just useful tools to get 
things done; that scientific evidence—hard to harvest and difficult to interpret as it might be—is 
nonetheless still evidence (and the only real evidence) to abide to does not mean undermining 
pluralism in science or in society.  Similarly, recognising that our scientific knowledge is situated 
and perspectival, it is always from a specific vantage point (that of the available instruments, 
conceptual resources, and scientific practice of the time) does not make scientific inquiry any less 
realistic, or any less committed to finding out the truth about nature to the best that we can. This 
is what I call the empowering role in this three-vector social function of philosophy of science. 
Over the past few years, I have been spending time studying some of these scientific 
practices and modelling techniques. I have benefitted enormously from helpful conversations with 
colleagues in physics with an eye to better understanding how it is possible for us—finite human 
beings with the epistemic limits afforded by our perspectival knowledge—to go about exploring 
the unexplored. How it is possible to come up with new theories and models that—grounded and 
entrenched in our existing modelling practices— might nonetheless be used as probes to assess the 
available evidence and provide indications for new unknow physics beyond the Standard Model. 
Through this dialogue with working scientists, by studying some of their fascinating work and 
visionary practices, I have come to rethink the way in which truth, representation, perspectives and 
pluralism are typically portrayed in the literature. I believe some traditional controversies about 
realism and antirealism in science originate from widespread philosophical assumptions about how 
models work; the relation between theory and evidence; and the role of representation in science. 
And I have been suggesting a novel way of thinking about these traditional issues, a novel way that 
has the potential of reconciling realism in science with pluralism and perspectivism. But this would 
be the topic of a research paper that I do not have the time to give here and the best I can do is to 
refer the reader to the website of my European Research Council project Perspectival Realism. Science, 
Knowledge and Truth from a Human Vantage Point (http://www.perspectivalrealism.org), where the full 
list of academic publications is available (and I am currently writing a monograph on this very same 
topic).  
To conclude, there are many reasons why philosophy of science matters to science. These 
reasons have all got to do with the threefold value of interdisciplinary research (see Fig. 1).  
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Fig. 1: The threefold value of interdisciplinary research, and related social function of philosophy 
of science. 
 
 
As I have highlighted, philosophy of science contributes to each and every of these three main 
values: it contributes to the exploratory value by being continuous with science; to the unifying value 
by providing a meta-level where common methodological strategies can be evaluated; and to critical 
engagement by performing an important social function. Such social function is in turn articulated 
around what I have respectively called the enabling, self-reflective, and empowering roles that 
philosophy of science plays for science. 
Let me briefly return to Bernal and his portrait of the “modern man before the man-made 
disasters of technological unemployment and scientific warfare, whereby the dangerous grip which 
demagogic fascist ideas can exercise is a measure both of popular ignorance and the need to have 
something to believe”.36 Making the public aware that plurality of perspectives does not mean 
anything goes; and it does not mean that the evidence on one side is as good as evidence on the 
other side. Making the public appreciates that truth matters (in life as well as in science) and making 
the general public engage with these philosophical questions, best serves the needs of democratic, 
tolerant, and pluralist societies. Because it is this kind of interdisciplinary knowledge that empowers 
people to make informed decisions and responsible choices for themselves and for the future of 
their children. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I thank James Upton for helping with the organisation of this lecture, and Professor John Wood 
for chairing the event. Themes and topics from this lecture are part of a project that has received 
funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme (grant agreement European Consolidator Grant H2020-ERC-
2014-CoG 647272 Perspectival Realism. Science, Knowledge, and Truth from a Human Vantage Point). 
 17 
 
NOTES 
1 See I.B. Cohen, Franklin and Newton. An inquiry into speculative Newtonian Experimental Science and Franklin’s work in 
electricity as an example thereof, Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, (1956).  
2 Herman Boerhaave, Elementa chemiae, quae anniversario labore docuit, in publicis, privatisque, scholis (Lugduni Batavorum, 
apud Isaacum Severinum, 1732). Elements of chemistry: being the Annual Lectures (English translation by T. Dallowe (1735), 
Vol. 2. London: J. Pemberton et al. And Stephen Hales, Vegetable Staticks: or, an Account of some Statical Experiments on 
the Sap in Vegetables: being an essay towards a Natural History of Vegetation. Also a Specimen of an attempt to analyse the air, by a 
great variety of chymio-statical experiments; which were read at several meetings before the Royal Society (London: W. and J. Innys, 
and T. Woodward, 1727). Edition with a foreword by M. A. Hoskin (1961), London: Oldbourne. 
3 See Michela Massimi ‘Kant’s dynamical theory of matter in 1755, and its debt to speculative Newtonian 
experimentalism’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42, 525-543 (2011). 
4 In Andrew Janiak. Newton. Philosophical Writings. Cambridge University Press (2014).  
5 Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London, Joseph Streator, 1687/1713). The Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy (London, Benjamin Motte, 1729). Translation revised by Florian Cajori (1934), Berkeley, 
University of California Press. General Scholium, 940. 
6 English translations of all these texts have appeared in Eric Watkins (Ed.) Natural Science. The Cambridge edition of the 
works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
7 Immanuel Kant (1747) Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte und Beurteilung der Beweise, deren sich Herr 
von Leibniz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen, welche die Kraft der 
Körper überhaupt betreffen. English translation ‘Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces’. In Eric Watkins (Ed.) 
Kant. Natural Science. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge University Press, 2012. For 
a discussion of this text in the historical context of the time, please see Michela Massimi and Silvia De Bianchi 
‘Cartesian echoes in Kant’s philosophy of nature’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44, 481–492 (2013). 
8 Immanuel Kant Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Riga, Johann Hartknoch, 1786). English translation 
Metaphysical foundations of natural science. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
9 See Michela Massimi, ‘Prescribing laws to nature’, Kant-Studien 105 (4), 491-508 (2014). Massimi, ‘Grounds, modality, 
and nomic necessity in the Critical Kant’, in Massimi, M. and Breitenbach A. (eds.) Kant and the Laws of Nature, 
Cambridge University Press (2017). And Massimi, ‘Laws of nature and nomic necessity. Was Kant really a projectivist?’, 
Proceedings of the XII International Kant Congress “Nature and Freedom”. Ed. Violetta Waibel and Margit Ruffing. Berlin, De 
Gruyter (forthcoming). 
10 See Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought. Kepler to Einstein, Harvard University Press (1973/1988), 
128-31 and ch. 7. 
11 Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, ‘Can quantum mechanical description of physical reality be 
considered complete?’, Physical Review 47 (10), 777–80. And Niels Bohr, ‘Can quantum mechanical description of 
physical reality be considered complete?’, Physical Review 48 (8), 696–702.  
12 Michela Massimi Pauli’s Exclusion Principle. The Origin and Validation of a Scientific Principle, Cambridge University Press 
(2005). 
13 Helen Longino, Studying Human Behaviour: How Scientists investigate aggression and sexuality, University of Chicago Press 
(2013).  
14 See for example LaRosa, E., & Danks, D. Impacts on trust of healthcare AI. In Proceedings of the 2018 
AAAI/ACM Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society (in press). 
15 See https://home.cern/about/updates/2017/12/forty-years-first-pet-image-cern. I am very grateful to Marilena 
Streit-Bianchi for helpful conversations on this topic and reference materials. 
16 Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science, Notre Dame University Press, revised edition (1966). 
17 The LCDM model is the standard cosmological model, which postulates the existence of both dark energy (captured 
by L) and cold dark matter (CDM) to explain the observed accelerated expansion of the universe and the formation 
of structure over time, respectively. 
18 For example the Dark Energy Survey (DES), which is one of the largest ongoing cosmological surveys designed to 
search for evidence of dark energy, uses the Bayes Factor along the Jeffreys scale to assess the evidence vis-à-vis two 
rival hypothesis, where the null hypothesis is the official LCDM model and the rival H1 is a variation of LCDM model 
called wCDM where the equation of state parameter w is not fixed, but is a free parameter. Thus, while wCDM shares 
with LCDM the six main cosmological parameters (e.g. the Hubble parameter, the matter energy density, etc.), it also 
has a seventh additional free parameter in w. Given two hypotheses Ho (say LCDM) and H1 (wCDM) and data set D, 
the Bayes factor is defined as follows: 
 
                                               
 18 
                                                                                                                                                  𝑅 = #(%|'()#(%|'*) = #	,𝐻./𝐷1#('*)#('*		|%)#('()     
 
Assuming equal flat priors for Ho and H1, the Bayes factor becomes the ratio of the posterior probability of Ho to the 
posterior probability of H1. In other words, the Bayes factor is a way of measuring the posterior probability of the 
evidence D in favour of Ho (the null hypothesis in the usual Bayesian terminology, in this case LCDM) over the rival 
H1 (wCDM in this case). How to interpret the numerical values of the Bayes factor R? DES adopts the standard 
Jeffreys scale (Jeffreys 1939/1961, Theory of probability, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press), whereby 3.2 < R <10 is 
regarded as substantial evidence for Ho over H1 and, and R > 10 is regarded as strong evidence for Ho. Vice versa, H1 is 
strongly favoured over H0 if R <0.1 and there is substantial evidence for H1 if 0.1<R <0.31. See DES Collaboration 
‘Dark Energy Survey Year 1 Results. Cosmological Constraints from Galaxy Clustering and Weak Lensing’, Physical 
Review D 98, 043526 (2018). 
19 I have discussed some of the epistemic limits of using the Bayes factor in cosmology in Michela Massimi ‘A 
philosopher’s look at DES. Reflections on the use of Bayes Factor in cosmology’, in O. Lahav et al (eds.) The Dark 
Energy Survey, World Scientific (forthcoming). 
20 Margaret Morrison, Reconstructing Reality. Models, Mathematics, and Simulations, Oxford University Press (2015). 
21 John Desmond Bernal, The social function of science, Routledge, London (1939). 
22 Madam du Chatelet was a French philosopher and scientist, who translated Newton’s Principia in French and wrote 
in 1740 the Institutions De Physique, an important text in the history of natural philosophy that influenced also the young 
Kant and that only recently has been rediscovered thanks to the Project Vox (https://projectvox.library.duke.edu) at 
Duke University, whose goal is to rediscover forgotten women voices in the history of philosophy.  
23 Rubin, V. C., W.K. Ford , N. Thonnard, ‘Rotational properties of 21 SC galaxies with a large range of luminosities 
and radii’, Astrophysical Journal 238, 471–87 (1980) 
24 Tully, R.B. and Fisher, J.R., ‘A new method for determining the distances to galaxies’, Astron. Astrophys. 54, 661–73 
(1977). 
25 See for example Lelli, F., McGaugh, S. S., Schombert, J.M., ‘The small scatter of the Baryonic Tully-Fisher relation’. 
The Astrophysical Journal Letters 816, L14, 1–6 (2016). 
26 See for example Cattaneo, A., Blaizot, J., Devriendt, J.E.G., et al. ‘The new semianalytic code GalICS2.0—
reproducing the galaxy stellar mass function and the Tully-Fisher relation simultaneously’, Monthly Notices of the Royal 
Astronomical Society 471, 1401-27 (2017).  
27 See for example Justin Khoury, ‘Another path for the emergence of modified galactic dynamics from dark matter 
superfluidity’, Physical review D 93, 103533.1–14 (2016). 
28 I have addresses some of these issues in Massimi, ‘Three problems about multiscale modelling in cosmology’, 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, early view (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2018.04.002) 
29 Michela Massimi, ‘Perspectival modeling’, Philosophy of Science 85, 335–359 (2018). 
30 See for example the ATLAS Collaboration, G. Aad, B. Abbott et al., ‘Summary of the ATLAS experiment’s sensitivity 
to supersymmetry after LHC Run 1—interpreted in the phenomenological MSSM;, Journal of High Energy Physics 134, 
1–74 (2015). And the CMS Collaboration, Khachatryan, V., et al., ‘Search for new physics with the MT2 variable in all-
jets final states produced in pp collisions at √s = 13 TeV’, Journal of High Energy Physics 6, 1–60 (2016) 
31 For a contemporary overview on scientific realism, see Juha Saatsi (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, 
London: Routledge (2018). 
32 For a brief overview, please see Michela Massimi ‘Perspectival Realism’, in J. Saatsi (ed) The Routledge Handbook of 
Scientific Realism, London: Routledge (2018). 
33 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
34 See Catherine Elgin, True Enough, Oxford University Press, 2017. 
35 Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, Harvard University Press, 1990. 
36 John Desmond Bernal, The social function of science, Routledge, London (1939), p.88. 
 
